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BEYOND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A NEW VISION
FOR WOMEN WORKERS
MARY ANN MASON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although its political campaign for an official equal rights
amendment to the U.S. Constitution failed, the second wave of
feminism' has achieved substantial progress toward imple-
menting equal rights in the workplace. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,2 the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 3 and the many
court decisions which have both enforced and broadened the
scope of these acts have established the principle, at least, of
equal opportunity for women in the workplace.
In spite of the many equal rights triumphs, the condition
of working women has demonstrably deteriorated on several
counts over the past twenty-five years. Women still earn about
sixty-four cents to every dollar earned by men, just as they did
in 1956,4 before the advent of the Equal Pay Act or Title VII,
and yet, combining their work inside and outside the home,
they are working about six hours longer each week than they
were in 1959.1 Moreover, women are losing ground compared
with their European counterparts. America lags far behind
* J.D., Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Law and Social Welfare, University
of California at Berkeley.
1. The first wave, officially launched by the Seneca Falls Convention in
1848, insisted upon certain limited legal rights, particularly property rights
for married women and later, suffrage. By the beginning of the twentieth
century this wave of feminism had broadened to include advocacy for poor
working women and children, which included some protective workplace
legislation. The second wave of feminism exploded in the late 1960s, this
time with a definite demand for strict equal rights with men in all spheres.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-17 (1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1989). The EPA is an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (Supp. III 1990).
4. There is continuing controversy about this figure. In 1985, a Rand
Study put the figure at 62q to the male dollar, while in the same year the
National Research Council reported the figure was 594 to the dollar. The
U.S. Census reported this figure at 704 in 1987. None of these studies,
however, takes into consideration the huge numbers of women who work part
time. This would lower the figure considerably.
5. Victor R. Fuchs, Sex Differences in Economic ell-Being, 232 Sci. 459,
460 (1986).
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other industrialized countries in maternity leave, child care,
vacation time, and family sick leave policies. American women
also trail their European counterparts in wages earned com-
pared to men.6
It is the premise of this article that the success of equal
opportunity has, in some important ways, promoted failure for
women in the workplace. The ideology of equality has limited
the vision of women when, for the first time in history, most
women are required to participate in the workplace. A strict
equal opportunity policy does not take into account the fact
that the majority of women workers today are mothers. This
policy holds mothers to a male model of competition when they
are not in an equal position to compete. Nor does the male
model of the workplace allow any special accommodation for
the needs of children.
This article will first, critically analyze the impact of an
equal rights strategy on the lives of working women, and sec-
ond, suggest new policy initiatives that will broaden the scope
of strategies for women in the workplace and consider the
needs of children as well. These initiatives will be placed in the
historical context of the first wave of feminism, with its broader
focus on women's rights, rather than equal rights. Finally, an
argument will be made for a return to the more flexible stan-
dard of women's rights.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not originally
intended to include women, but rather to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination against Blacks and ethnic minorities. An
amendment which included sex was added almost as an after-
thought.7 Although Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA) represent the major legislative weapons in women's fight
for an equal position in the marketplace, it is clear, more than
twenty-five years later, that they fall far short of that goal.
6. In Italy women's wages in 1982 were 86% of men's, in Denmark
86%, in France 78%, in Sweden 74%, and in West Germany 73%. See SYLVIA
ANN HEWLIrr, A LESSER LIFE 73 (1986).
7. The House of Representatives did not amend Title VII Bill to
prohibit sex discrimination until two days before voting on it. Until then, the
Title VII did not mention sex at all: "The intolerable practice of failing or
refusing to hire a qualified job applicant or otherwise discriminating against
an employee as to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment solely because of race, color, religion, or national origin . . . is
wrong and must be made legally wrong." H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
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These laws fit the equal rights model, but they fail to take into
account the realities of women's work patterns. Except for the
issues of pregnancy discrimination and maternity leave, the
concept of motherhood or even the words children or family
are very rarely, if ever, mentioned in judicial opinions or legis-
lation relating to the workplace.8
Title VII mandates that an individual's sex (gender is the
more recent term), race, color, religion, or national origin shall
not be grounds for discrimination in hiring, discharge, com-
pensation, and terms of conditions of employment.9 Basically,
Title VII mandates that women and minorities be given an
equal opportunity to compete with white males in matters relat-
ing to employment and the EPA directs that they receive the
same compensation as white males when they perform equal
tasks. 10
Until recently, the Supreme Court liberally interpreted
Title VII to the advantage of women and minorities."
Although the law was narrowly written, with no provision for
affirmative action, the court allowed, with restrictions, the
development of this important tool.'" Even when the court
8. Even in its several rulings on pregnancy discrimination the Supreme
Court mentioned family or children only once. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); California
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Marshall, writing for the
majority in Guerra, noted, "By 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's
pregnancy disability leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have
families without losing their jobs." Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289. The case,
however, was decided as a federal pre-emption issue.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a) (1989).
10. See MARY ANN MASON, THE EQUALITY TRAP (1988). In this book, I
discuss the limitations of Title VII and the EPA in dealing with female
dominated occupations. These laws were enacted to force entry into male
occupations, not to aid women who work in female occupations. In a sense
these two pieces of legislation are conservative in nature since they require
no structural changes in the workplace, such as pregnancy leaves or
institutionalized part-time work, but simply permit women to compete in the
existing structure. See generally id. chs. 1, 4, 5.
11. In a trio of 1989 decisions, the Supreme Court altered this trend
with three cases that somewhat narrowed the scope of Title VII, particularly
with regard to affirmative action. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 469
(1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
12. See generally Eleanor Holmes Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in
Interpretation - SurvivalAgainst the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1988). Title VII
expressly states that preferential treatment is not required merely because of
statistical imbalance with a group of employees compared to the available
work force. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1980). An employer is under no obligation to hire a woman to balance the
ratio between the sexes, nor to establish that the male hired is more qualified
1992]
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took a sharply conservative turn in 1989, they offered the nota-
ble exception of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'3 which further
expanded the effectiveness of Title VII by putting the burden
in some cases on the employer to show that gender discrimina-
tion was not the cause of denying promotion. 4
III. THE WAGE GAP AND FEMALE OCCUPATIONS
The judicial successes of Title VII, however, mask the fact
that women are still doing very poorly in the marketplace com-
pared with men. In 1956, a full-time working woman earned
sixty-three cents to every dollar earned by a man. In 1986 the
figure was sixty-four cents.' 5 There have been slight fluctua-
tions during these thirty years, but by and large the wage gap
has proved stubbornly intractable.
The most important change in the workplace is not that
women are entering male dominated occupations, but that
women are entering the workforce in unprecedented num-
bers,' 6 and that most of these women are working in female
dominated occupations. Employed women are clustered into
four industry groups with almost seventy percent in services
and retailing and state and local government.' 7 As the econ-
omy shifts from a manufacturing to a service base, most of the
newly created jobs have gone to women. What these jobs have
in common is that they are generally lower paying and less well
than the female not hired, nor to hire the female rather than an equally
qualified male.
13. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
14. Id. at 261. The Court disagreed as to whether this shifting of the
burden to the defendant was following precedent or taking a new turn. The
plurality stated it was not a new interpretation, while Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, stated: "McDonnell Douglas and Burdine assumed that the
plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion as to both these attacks, and we
clearly depart from that framework today. Such a departure requires
justification, and its outlines should be clearly drawn." Id. at 270 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Justice O'Connor went on to note that before the burden of
proof could be shifted to the employer, "the plaintiff must produce evidence
sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
particular employment decision such that a reasonable fact finder could draw
an inference that the decision was made 'because of' the plaintiff's protected
status." Id. at 278.
15. See Gail G. Kaplan, Pay Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of
Comparable Worth Into Employer Liability Under Title VII, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
305, 306 n.2 (1987).
16. In 1960, 23 million women were in the workforce; in 1986, 52
million were participating. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC
EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 20 (1986).
17. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 306-07 n.3.
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benefitted than jobs in the manufacturing sector. 8 Therefore
the wage gap persists.
Title VII and the EPA have been fairly successful tools for
breaking down the barriers to male professions and attaining
equal pay and promotions once inside, but they have been
nearly useless in dealing with the low pay inequities of female
dominated occupations. Title VII focuses on individual dis-
crimination in hiring, not institutional inequities in setting pay.
Employers do not often discriminate against women when they
hire retail clerks, word processors, or nurses. They do, how-
ever, offer them lower pay than male dominated occupations
with similar skill. As discussed below, the courts have inter-
preted this wage setting as outside the range of protection of
Title VII. 19
A. Integration Theory and Comparable Worth
There are two prominent theories on how to tackle the
problem of low pay in female-dominated occupations. The first
is the integration theory. According to this theory, if the dis-
crimination barriers to male occupations are removed, women
will pour into male occupations. The consequent shortage of
workers in female occupations will force the wages up, luring
men into the jobs formerly held by women. With this free mar-
ket approach, the distinctions between male and female occu-
pations will fall naturally.20
In spite of Title VII and its expansion into affirmative
action, this has not occurred. 2' The great majority of women
have not entered male occupations and remain rooted in the
low paying female occupations. Although more women have
entered male occupations, even larger numbers have entered
female occupations and the occupational profile has changed
little.
The second approach to solving the problem of the persis-
tent low wages of female occupations is to focus on elevating
their low wage base rather than trying to equalize the gender
18. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 15 (Nov. 1986). According to the Department of
Commerce, 50.7% of all women work in only 19 of the 503 occupational
categories. Id. at 18 (Table 8). All except three of the 19 occupations in
which women are concentrated are 60% or more female and 15 of the 19
predominantly female occupations pay in the bottom half of 421 ranked
earnings. Id. at 23.
19. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
20. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 314.
21. See supra note 10.
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make-up of the occupations. This theory has become known in
America as comparable worth or pay equity. Title VII has
made some inroads into integrating the work force, but there
are strong reasons why most women still choose women's occu-
pations. The largest increase of new recruits to the labor mar-
ket since 1970 has been mothers. In 1970, only 27.3% of
women with children under the age of three were in the
workforce; in 1985 the figure was more than 50%.2 Female
dominated occupations provide some of the conditions that
make the work lives of mothers (or fathers who are the primary
caretakers) possible. For the most part they provide, as male
dominated occupations often do not, regular hours, little or no
overtime, and the ability to leave and return to accommodate
pregnancy or the needs of children.23 More of these jobs are
closer to home and daycare.
Comparable worth, or pay equity, the popular American
woman's issue of the eighties, represents a serious shift away
from the integrationist goal of the seventies. Comparable
worth is based on a realization that for whatever reasons (cer-
tainly motherhood prominent among them), most women will
continue to work in women's occupations rather than move
into male occupations. Therefore, these occupations must be
forced to pay a fair wage. The idea is technically complex,
24
but the basic concept is that employers can and should pay
wages according to the intrinsic value of a given job rather than
market or other forces. The Supreme Court, in the County of
22. See BERGMANN, supra note 16, at 25 (Table 2-3).
23. There is a lively debate on this subject. See, e.g., HENRYJ. AARON &
CAMERAN M. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 13-15 (1986);
MASON, supra note 10.
24. Comparable worth analysis varies depending on the economic
model used. For a discussion of neoclassical (I have referred to it as the
integration theory) and institutional theories, see SARA M. EVANS & BARBARA
J. NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE 46-53 (1989) [hereinafter WAGE JUSTICE]. Briefly,
the neoclassical theory uses an individualistic model that assumes perfectly
mobile workers, competitive capitalists, and costless information. In this
model, workers choose their occupations and competition among firms with
equalized wages. Earnings differentials can be explained in part by
discrimination based on workers' individual characteristics, including
schooling, training, and previous participation in the workforce. The
institutional approach, on the other hand, focuses on the organizational and
institutional forces involved. Two important premises of this model are the
difficulty of determining individual workers' contributions and the inequality
of occupations themselves. This model focuses on occupational segregation,
its historical roots, and how institutional factors contribute to wage
differentials. One conclusion is that the gender make-up of an occupation is
a key indicator of earnings.
A NEW VISION FOR WOMEN WORKERS
Washington v. Gunther,2' defined comparable worth as a theory
under which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on
the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of
their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or
community. 26 This theory is different than the EPA's "substan-
tially equal" work doctrine, which the Supreme Court inter-
preted in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 2 7 as occurring when an
employer pays unequal wages to male and female employees
for equal or substantially equal work requiring equal skill,
effort, and responsibilities under similar working condition.
The EPA, therefore, offers no relief for adjusting wages
between jobs that are very different in nature. Comparing a
maintenance person, for example, with a secretary is beyond
the legislative vision of the EPA.
Title VII, a far broader act, seemed for a while to hold
more promise to comparable worth advocates. There are two
theories available to a plaintiff in proving a Title VII case: dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact. Under a disparate
treatment analysis, "[t]he employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. '" 28 Proof of a discriminatory motive or
intent to discriminate is critical to a disparate treatment claim,
although in some situations it may be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment. 2 9 By contrast, the disparate
impact theory is not concerned with an employer's intent, but
rather, focuses on the effects of an employer's practice."a Dis-
parate impact occurs when an employer relies on a facially neu-
tral practice that has a disproportionately adverse impact on
members of a particular protected group.3
25. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
26. Id. at 166.
27. 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). To be actionable under the EPA, sex-
based wage discrimination must occur within a single establishment. See 29
C.F.R. § 1620.9 (1991).
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
29. Id.
30. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs
Court stated that: "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures .. .that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups." Id. at 432.
31. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
In Pouncy, the court stated: "This theory of recovery under Title VII is used
to attach employment selection criteria that are facially neutral yet fall more
harshly on a protected class of employees." Id. at 799.
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Thus far, attempts to force the courts to accept compara-
ble worth as gender-based discrimination under the protective
umbrella of Title VII have failed. The Supreme Court in the
1981 Gunther decision distinguished comparable worth claims
from other claims of intentional discrimination which are
actionable under Title VII and decided the case on grounds
other than a comparable worth theory. 3 2 Justice Brennan par-
ticularly noted that the Court had not decided whether a com-
parable worth claim is sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of sex discrimination. 3' To date the Supreme Court has still
not decided, leaving the issue for the lower courts to struggle
with.
The lower federal courts have been distinctly unsympa-
thetic to comparable worth. For a brief period a United States
district court judge from Washington state, Judge Tanner, gave
hope to comparable worth proponents when he found that the
existence of wage disparity, as evidenced by the job evaluation
study of 15,500 male and female employees in Washington
state, established a prima facie case of wage discrimination
under either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact the-
ory.34 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, over-
turned the district court's ruling two years later. The reversal
was on several grounds, but the prominent theme that per-
vaded the decision was that wages that are set by the market-
place are not necessarily discriminatory on either a disparate
treatment or a disparate impact theory.3 5 The court held:
"Absent a showing of discriminatory motive, which has not
been made here, the law does not permit the federal courts to
interfere in the market-based system for the compensation of
Washington's employees." 3 6
32. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180-81 (1981).
33. Id. at 166 n.8.
34. AFSCME v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846, 864 (S.D. Wash. 1983),
rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court held that, under a disparate
impact theory, the objective facially neutral practice was the defendant's
system of compensation. Id. The Court found that "[t]he evidence is
overwhelming that there has been historical discrimination against women
... and that discrimination has been, and is manifested by direct, overt, and
institutionalized discrimination." Id.
35. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985). The
circuit court of appeals emphasized that "the decision [of the State of
Washington] to base compensation on the competitive market, rather than on
a theory of comparable worth, involves the assessment of a number of
complex factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be
appropriate for a disparate impact analysis." Id. at 1406 (citing Spaulding v.
University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir. 1984)).
36. Id. at 1408.
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Other federal courts have followed a similar line of reason-
ing; it is not enough to demonstrate that employees of different
genders receive different compensation for comparable work of
equal intrinsic value.37 Rather, a plaintiff must show that there
was intentional discrimination in the wage-setting.3 8 A show-
ing of comparability accompanied by wage disparities is never
enough unless accompanied by additional circumstantial evi-
dence of an employer's discriminatory conduct. One court
ruled that female workers are permitted to seek employment in
higher-paying job classifications, and wage disparities, there-
fore, must reflect the relative market value of the jobs. 9
The courts are correct in their analysis that Title VII was
not intended, nor can it be stretched, to cover the fundamental
problem of persistently low wages in female dominated occu-
pations. In fact, as noted, the act was not originally drafted to
cover the problems of women at all.40 Title VII is based on a
free market model of individualistic liberty that presents the
view that if the impediments of discrimination are knocked
down, men and women (as well as minorities) will be able to
compete on equal footing. This equal competition will pro-
mote job integration4 so that women and minorities will no
longer be segregated into low paying, limited clusters of jobs.
With fewer women available, the former women's occupations
will be forced to raise their wages, thereby attracting both men
and women.
The concept of comparable worth is in direct opposition to
the concept of individualistic liberty put forth by Title VII. 42
Comparable worth offers a non-competitive model of fairness
or equity, achieved not through competition with men in men's
occupations, but by elevating the depressed wages of women's
occupations. Implicit in the argument (although rarely men-
tioned) is the recognition that most women are not going to
push to integrate male occupations. The free market model of
37. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126 (7th Cir.
1987); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 726-27 (7th Cir.
1986).
38. American Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 726-27.
39. Colby, 811 F.2d at 1126.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1989).
41. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing integration
theory).
42. Arguably, if one turned around the language of Title VII,
comparable worth may be seen as reverse discrimination since the effect of
reclassifying jobs has a disparate impact on men. It can also be argued that
reclassification constitutes disparate treatment since the intention of
reclassification is to boost the low pay of women's jobs.
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Title VII severely limits the ability of the courts both in finding
discrimination as the basis of depressed female wages and in
imposing changes in the wage structure. Unless intentional
discrimination can be proved under a disparate treatment the-
ory, the courts must recognize a free market wage setting
defense. Even if intentional discrimination were found, the
court, following the lead of Gunther, would be unlikely to gener-
alize their finding to support an institution-wide re-classifica-
tion system, but would most probably limit its ruling to
adjusting that specific job classification.
Arguably, it is the role of the legislature, not the Court, to
initiate reforms which have a widespread effect on the market-
place. In fact, the idea of tampering with the so-called free
market44 in order to achieve fairness is already prominent in
the American system. Historically, Congress has intervened in
the marketplace by setting the minimum wage, legislating child
labor laws, guaranteeing collective bargaining, and passing
such acts as the Fair Labor Standards Act.45 In the case of com-
parable worth, it is the appropriate role of Congress to rectify
the severe limitations of Title VII and the EPA and guarantee
equal pay for jobs of comparable value. Since 1982, the House
of Representatives has compiled voluminous testimony and
congressional representatives in both houses have introduced
bills on the subject of comparable worth during every ses-
sion.46 The Reagan administration, however, following the
lead of the private sector opposition, became increasingly hos-
tile to the concept. In 1985, the Reagan-appointed Civil Rights
Commission voted to reject comparable worth as a remedy for
sex bias in the workplace and two months later the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission voted unanimously to
43. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The County of
Washington conducted internal and external studies which indicated that
female prison guards should be paid 95% of the salary paid to male
correction officers, yet the county paid females 70% of their job's value and
the men 100%. Id. at 180-81. The Court here decided that the county had
violated its own salary survey and discriminated by treating men more
advantageously than women. Id.
44. See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 315.
45. See id. See generally FRANK C. MORRIS ET AL., JUDICIAL WAGE
DETERMINATION . . . A VOLATILE SPECTRE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARABLE
WORTH (1984) (discussing the economic controversies regarding wage
setting and free market theories).
46. See, e.g., H.R. No. 41, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Pay Equity
Technical Assistance Act).
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reject pure comparable worth cases where there was no evi-
dence of intentional discrimination.47
In the absence of a congressional model, states have
increasingly taken strong steps toward pay equity. By 1987, ten
states had implemented some form of pay equity policies48 and
twenty-seven states and 166 localities had begun comparable
worth studies. 49 A pay equity policy is defined as a compensa-
tion goal of equal pay for work of comparable value for state
employees. These policies have been promoted by governors,
legislatures, public employee unions, and women's interests
groups. Their enactment has sometimes come about through
state or local legislation and sometimes through labor union
negotiations.5" So far their reach has been limited to public
sector jobs.
Among states that have taken action, Minnesota has most
completely adopted and implemented a comparable worth
scheme for public employees.5 Its experience serves as a
model to other states. In 1984, it passed a State Employees Pay
Equity Act5 2 and in 1985 a Local Government Pay Equity Act.53
The process clearly revealed the depth of the connections
between jobs and gender. Ninety percent of the employees eli-
gible for pay equity increases were working in thirteen occupa-
tions: secretaries, other clerical employees, teacher aides,
other school aides, cooks, other food service employees, non-
nursing medical employees, nurses (RN, LPN), social services
employees, library employees, city clerks, clerk treasurers, and
liquor store employees. The great majority of workers in these
jobs were women.54 Although some of these jobs received
47. WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 41.
48. States with pay equity policies include Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 362 n.360. As of 1987, only Arkansas, Georgia,
and Idaho have taken no action at all on this issue at the state level. Id.
49. The following states have pay equity studies: Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Kaplan, supra note
15, at 362 n.361.
50. Id. at 363 n.370. Of the ten states which have pay equity policies,
seven were established by legislation, two by administrative policy and one by
executive order.
51. For a complete discussion of Minnesota's experience in passing
comparable worth laws, see WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 69-91.
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 43A.01-.47 (West 1988).
53. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 471.991-.999 (West Supp. 1992).
54. WAGE JUSTICE, supra nofe 24, at 159.
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healthy boosts in pay following reclassification, the spectre of
financial doom that had been predicted by comparable worth
opponents did not materialize in Minnesota. There was some
variation between counties, but the average cost of implemen-
tation was 2.6% of the county's payroll.5 5
Comparable worth is a critical strategy in closing the wage
gap between men and women workers. It addresses the real
pattern of women's work lives. One of the major reasons that
women continue to work in female occupations is that most
women at some time must balance the duties of motherhood
and work,56 and often choose jobs which make this balance eas-
ier. These choices are for the benefit of children as well as
mothers. Comparable worth also addresses the fact that
employers have exploited this choice in the past and paid
women less than a fair wage. Title VII allows this practice to
continue since Title VII gives women an equal opportunity to
compete for higher wages in men's occupations, but women
are given no relief if they remain in women's occupations.
Relief will be obtained only through strong new compara-
ble worth legislation both at the federal and state level, eventu-
ally embracing both public and private sectorjobs. Drawing on
the successful experience of Minnesota, and other governmen-
tal entities, pay equity legislation would normally consist of two
phases. In the first phase, all government jobs would be evalu-
ated by a single job-evaluation system which measures in detail
the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions of every
job classification and combines to produce a single score for
every classification. For instance, in the widely used Hay evalu-
ation system, a supervisor of keypunch operators received a
total of 268 points: 152 for know-how, 50 for problem solving,
and 66 for accountability. The job receives 152 points for
know-how because the job classification requires advanced
vocational training, the job is first-line supervision of a single
function, and the job involves proficiency in human relations. 57
The second phase would be to readjust federal employee
wage scales to reflect the completed evaluations. With evalua-
tions in hand it is possible to compare the value of a highway
technician with a clerk stenographer and determine if their cur-
55. Id.
56. It is estimated that 85% of all working women will become
pregnant during their working life. See Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave:
Taking Sex Differences Into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 701 (1986).
57. Ronnie Steinberg & Lois Haignere, Separate but Equivalent Pay for
Work of Comparable Worth, in GENDER AT WORK 25 (Women's Research and
Education Institute ed., 1984).
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rent salary fairly reflects their job, compared to other jobs. All
workers holding jobs of equal value would not necessarily be
paid the same wages since seniority, merit, or quantity of work
accomplished could still be used to differentiate among work-
ers. The Minnesota experience, with its average increase of
2.6% in payroll per county58 suggests that a wage scale based
on pay equity will not cause undue hardship. Ultimately, in the
same spirit of fairness which prompted the Minimum Wage Act
and the Equal Pay Act, pay equity should be federally man-
dated for private businesses as well.
B. Part-Time Workers
The special demands of motherhood are most clearly evi-
dent among female part-time workers.59 The voluntarily part-
time workforce is made up largely of women, most of whom are
primarily responsible for the care of their children.60 In 1983,
the Department of Labor noted that the "general profile" of a
part-time worker was that of a woman with school-age children
who was married to a full-time worker. 6' Approximately one-
quarter of working women work part-time, but they represent
about seventy percent of the part-time workforce.62
In addition to the fact that the majority are women, part-
time workers have at least two major characteristics in com-
mon. They are paid significantly less than full-time workers on
a pro rata basis,63 and they are distinctly clustered in wholesale
and retail trade and service sectors in which full-time workers
tend to be poorly paid.64 Most often they represent female
enclaves within female occupations, sharing the experience of
depressed wages that is the product of sex-based occupational
segregation. In addition to earning less, part-time workers
within these female-dominated occupations tend to have even
58. WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 159.
59. Since 1948, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has set a standard of 35
hours per week to distinguish full-time work from part-time work. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS 1 (Jan. 21, 1948) (Series P-50, No. 3).
60. See Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay
Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 715 (1986).
61. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983
HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 36, 37-38 (1983) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON
WOMEN WORKERS].
62. See Earl F. Mellor & George D. Stamas, Usual Weekly Earnings:
Another Look at Intergroup Differences and Basic Trends, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
15, 21 (Apr. 1982).
63. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 715 n.32.
64. See HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 61, at 37-38 n.122.
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less status and receive fewer benefits than full-time workers.65
A 1982 study found that only 18.59% of part-time employees
received health insurance, as compared to 74.3% of full-time
employees. 66 If part-time women workers were taken into
account, the wage gap between men and women would be sig-
nificantly wider than is now reported.67 However, while femi-
nists and unions have recently devoted their attention to
raising the wages of female dominated occupations through a
comparable worth analysis, very little notice has been given to
reforming the low wage, underbenefitted structure of part-time
work.
One of the explanations for the lack of attention to part-
time work may be that part-time work for women is perceived
as a second income, a pin money job for mothers. This percep-
tion, however, belies the economic reality of the changing wage
structure, where a single wage very often can no longer support
a family.68 It also does not take into account the current reality
of divorce, 69 which means many part-time workers are single
parents and sole breadwinners. For some women the inade-
quacy of childcare forces them to work part-time when they
would otherwise choose full-timejobs. A second explanation is
that it is only recently that feminists and unions have moved
away from the integrationist model of Title VII and realized
that the solution for all women will not be to join male occupa-
tions.70 This acceptance should now extend to the concept of
part-time work.
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act present even more limita-
tions for reforming the part-time wage structure than they do
for raising the depressed wages of full-time women workers.
As discussed above, the EPA prohibits payment of lower wages
to women who perform work "substantially equal" 7' to work
performed by men in the same establishment. 72 Most part-time
women workers are working in female-dominated occupations
65. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 718-19.
66. Colien Hefferan, Employee Benefits, 1 FAM. ECON. REV. 6, 10 (1985).
67. In 1981, women constituted 69% of the part-time work force. Part-
time workers are paid 51% of full-time male workers. See Chamallas, supra
note 60, at 714-15 n.60.
68. Between 1973 and 1985, the average weekly income of the typical
worker fell by 131%. Frank Levy, Are the Rich Getting Richer?, Actually We Are All
Growing Poorer, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1987, at C2.
69. Nearly half of all marriages entered into today are projected to end
in divorce. See LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION xvii (1985).
70. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
71. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 n.92 (1971).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1989).
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where it is far more likely that they are receiving proportionally
lower wages for "substantially equal work" performed by other
women, working full time, not men. This is not actionable dis-
crimination under the EPA. If, in fact, a woman can present a
prima facie case that she is receiving lower wages for "substan-
tially equal work" performed by a man, she still must face the
affirmative defenses on the part of the employer that are
allowed by the EPA. These defenses specify that unequal pay is
authorized if the disparity is the result of (1) a seniority system,
(2) a merit system, (3) a system measuring earnings by quantity
or quality of production, or (4) if the disparity is based on any
factor other than sex.73
Under this fourth affirmative defense, the Department of
Labor issued guidelines which presumptively excluded employ-
ees who work twenty or fewer hours from the protection of the
EPA.14 This fourth defense has been the subject of a great deal
of controversy, 75 particularly as to how the EPA is to be inte-
grated into a broader Title VII claim. The most recent
Supreme Court decision on this issue, County of Washington v.
Gunther, however, incorporates the four affirmative defenses of
the EPA into Title VII. 76 This leaves little hope for the part-
time worker of fewer than twenty hours per week who wishes to
establish a claim under the EPA or Title VII.
A comparable worth analysis under Title VII also presents
particular problems for part-time workers. Traditional compa-
rable worth analyses evaluate all full-time job classifications for
both men and women workers in terms of factors such as
knowledge, skill, and mental and physical demands, and com-
pares the wage rates. 77 Comparing the jobs of part-time work-
ers with other part-time workers is unlikely to bring relief since
the great majority will be other women workers in similarly
wage depressed jobs. In order to bring relief, part-time work-
ers must be considered a subset of the full-time job grouping in
which they work (if there is one). Even if this concept was
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.26 (1990). This interpretation covers temporary
workers as well as part-time workers. The interpretation uses one month of
employment as a rule of thumb to determine whether employment is in fact
temporary.
74. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 740.
75. A new interpretation which would have deleted part-time and
temporary defenses was proposed by the Carter Administration, but never
adopted. See id. at 739 n.175, 740 n.176.
76. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-71 (1981).
77. See WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 142-44.
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established, part-time workers face the same rejection by the
courts that full-time employees have experienced.
For the reasons discussed,78 the EPA and Title VII are not
likely to bring relief through the courts for part-time workers.
A better solution is legislation in which part-time work would
be considered as a discrete part of a pay equity law. There is
some legislative precedence for seeking equity with full-time
workers. Congress has established pro-rated health benefit
plans for federal employees,79 and in 1978 Congress passed
the Federal Employees Part-time Career Employment Act of
1978.80 The Act required every federal agency to set annual
goals and timetables for establishing part-time career employ-
ment positions within the federal civil service. In recent years
the interest and initiative in this issue has flagged, however,
and little or no commentary appears on the subject.
Part-time work that is fairly paid and benefitted could pro-
vide an attractive solution for mothers, children, employers,
and society. Mothers benefit because it would allow them to
earn a decent wage while better managing the obligations of
family; relying less on the vicissitudes and expense of paid
childcare. Children benefit because they would have more
access to their mothers, and society benefits because the chil-
dren's welfare is being looked to. Employers could benefit also
by having access to well-qualified employees who might other-
wise stay out of the workforce entirely.
IV. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE
A. The Mommy Track
While the huge numbers of part-time women workers in
female occupations have been largely ignored, there has been a
growing interest in initiating a voluntary part-time track in male
dominated occupations; this concept is sometimes referred to
as the "Mommy Track.""1 Many women have come to realize
that motherhood and the male career model are often not com-
patible. Rather than considering it their personal problem,
78. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing
comparable worth and the courts).
79. See Chamallas, supra note 60, at 717 n.47.
80. Id. at 723 n.90, citing Federal Employees Part-Time Career
Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3408 (1989).
81. A great media controversy was generated upon the publication of
Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65. Schwartz reviews the failure of management
women to combine motherhood and career and suggests a reduced hour
track, or "Mommy Track."
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women are now seeking a social solution to what is in fact a
social problem. Women in many male-dominated professions,
such as law, medicine, and the academic world are already fairly
well organized. It is a matter of setting priorities and not being
afraid to challenge the male model. For instance, women law-
yers (or men if they chose), could initiate an optional partner-
ship track where they could work twenty or thirty hours a week
for a period up to ten years of child raising before being con-
sidered for partner. 82 In professions which demand exception-
ally long hours, part-time work may be as much as forty hours a
week, on a regular schedule. Or women could initiate a perma-
nent part-time track where they would gain a permanent posi-
tion, perhaps an associate partnership, after a number of years,
but not full partnership rights. Job-sharing may be an option
for some women in some firms. This model could be adapted
for the university and the medical professions as well. Similar
initiatives could be taken by women's organizations in the busi-
ness world.83
Many feminists fear this approach is walking straight back
into the special preference trap. By acknowledging that women
need special consideration to handle motherhood, opponents
of the Mommy Track feel that women unnecessarily take them-
selves out of the male competitive game. They become second
string players, not likely to reach the top of their profession.
There is also concern that employers will refuse to hire them at
all since they require special arrangements and do not carry a
full load.84 For many women, however, the choice is not
between getting to the top or working part-time. The choice is
between working part-time or dropping out of the profession
entirely. Once a player drops out of a professional, male domi-
nated occupation, such as law, medicine, or academics, the
chances of reentry anywhere close to the same level are slim.
Having the option, but not the compulsion, to take a slower
track can only enlarge the range of choices available for
women, especially in the professions.
82. In California, the California State Bar's Committee on Women in
the Law has taken up the issue of part-time employment for women with
children. In a survey of Los Angeles firms with more than 20 attorneys, 11
firms have women working half to three-quarters time. These were
accommodations on an individual basis, not a general firm policy. The
criterion was that the woman has previously been a valued employee or was
considered to be someone very special. See RECORDER, Apr. 25, 1986, at 1.
83. MASON, supra note 10, at 166.
84. Jenifer A. Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path is Limited by "Mommy
Track, " N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, at Al.
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In the Mommy-Track controversy, as with others dealing
with equal treatment versus special consideration, the well-
being of the third party, the child, is rarely addressed. Surely it
is better for a child if the mother works thirty rather than sixty
hours a week. Surely it is better for a society to acknowledge
this and to encourage employers to create career tracks that are
not simply to accommodate women's differences, but are to
support families. Fathers could be eligible for these tracks as
well, avoiding the equal protection issue. This is not an issue
like custody where one must lose if the other wins. In fact,
however, it is far more likely that women will take advantage of
these tracks more often than men since women remain the pri-
mary caretakers.8 5
The creation of part-time career tracks in male dominated
professions will not come about through Title VII suits. Title
VII in fact endorses the current male model of the workplace
and offers relief only for those who are wrongfully barred from
joining it, In the public sector, legislative initiatives such as the
Federal Employees Part-time Career Employment Act of
197886 may be expanded to include high level management. In
the private sector it will require sustained efforts on the part of
organized women through their professional associations (and
interested men) to create and institutionalize career paths that
work for mothers or fathers and their children.
B. Maternity/Family Leaves
The great majority of recent arguments which pit equal
consideration against special consideration in the workplace
have focused on the specific act of birth, not only because that
is the one issue in which there is a clear-cut physical difference
between men and women which has implications in the work-
place, but also because, according to many feminists, it is the
only incidence in which men and women differ in the work-
place. Equal rights advocates attempt to minimize this differ-
ence by claiming that it is just another short-term disability.8 7
85. The New York City Board of Education, which has offered paternity
leaves since 1973, regularly grants about two thousand leaves each year to
mothers and four or five leaves to fathers. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS 466
(1980).
86. Federal Employees Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3408 (1989).
87. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 701(k),
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). The amendment provides, in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
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Congress has adopted the disability theory with the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978.88 This law requires employers to
make available to pregnant womeh only what they make avail-
able for men with short-term disabilities. These standards vary
widely from state to state.
To treat pregnancy as a short-term disability is a mistake
for both mother and child. First, it takes no notice of the baby,
which should have access to its mother during its first weeks.8 9
By refusing to consider the needs of children at birth as a work-
place issue, the pattern becomes set to ignore the needs of chil-
dren at all stages of their development. Childcare, flexible
hours, and family sick leave become individual problems and
not recognized as social problems of the workplace. Second,
by reducing the significance of childbirth to a disability, the
rights of the mother as well as the child are curtailed. Short-
term disabilities are not handled in a manner that accommo-
dates the effects of pregnancy. Benefits are usually for a few
weeks in duration, and beyond that the right to return to the
same or equivalent job is canceled.9 ° Childbirth requires an
absence of several months for the well-being of both child and
mother, but this is often only available at the expense of an
assured level of income maintenance, which is also needed.9'
By reducing the motherhood issues in the workplace to a short
period and defining it as a disability, the employer is freed from
considering any other employment issues related to mother-
hood. Disability policies do not include family illness or family
emergencies within their scope.
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
Id.
88. Id.
89. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act gives no consideration to the
needs of infants. By emphasizing that pregnancy and childbirth should be
treated as other disabilities, it precludes consideration of children's needs.
90. See California Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
The dispute was over the right of return to the same or comparable job after
four months of maternity leave. This right of return was not guaranteed for
disabilities.
91. Sweden provides a model of parental leave that includes substantial
income maintenance. Each family is allowed a nine-month leave (to be taken
by the mother or father, or split between them) at 90% pay, and an additional
three months at a further reduced rate of pay. See MASON, supra note 10, at
138.
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Considering pregnancy as a short-term disability is once
again yielding to a male model of the workplace.92 This is
surely to the employer's advantage since the cost of disability
benefits are far less than those of a continuing family support
program. It is true that historically, employers used pregnancy
as an excuse to keep women in low level jobs or to force them
out of the workplace entirely. Less than thirty years ago many
employers would not hire married women, or would not hire
married women with children. If a woman became pregnant
her choices were limited. Most often she was expected to quit,
and if she did not, she was fired.93 Many states had mandatory
leave policies that were unrelated to a woman's ability to work.
If a woman insisted upon returning to work after childbirth, her
hospital costs were not covered by medical insurance, her
maternity leave was not covered by disability insurance or sick
leave, and her job was not waiting for her when she returned.94
The job she returned to, if she were allowed to return at all,
would often be one with less responsibility and few advance-
ment possibilities since she was now considered an unreliable
worker.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title
VII,95 offers an equal treatment solution which is a limited
improvement over old policies. It requires that employers pro-
vide for women only the same disability policy that they already
provide for men. Very few of these policies are adequate to
meet the needs of pregnancy. Most women are entitled to no
more than six to eight weeks of pre- and post-natal leave, some
far less.96 This restriction can force women to return to work
prematurely in order to save their job, possibly endangering
their health and the health of their child. With some employ-
ers, the woman may not be allowed continuing benefits, such as
medical insurance during the time of the leave. Paid leave,
when it is allowed, is rarely with full pay, and usually for less
time than the total leave time. For women who are a major or
92. This is the same approach as Title VII which allows women to
compete with men on a male model. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying
text.
93. See ALICE KESSLER HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE
EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 234-35, 254-59, 296-97 (1982).
94. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: 4 Way Out of the
Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124 (1986).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1989).
96. See Finley, supra note 94, at 1125.
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sole contributor of family income, this may be an intolerable
burden.97
After two false starts in Geduldig v. Aiello9" and General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert,99 the Supreme Court in Guerra moved in the
correct direction when it endorsed California's maternity leave
legislation giving mothers significantly more leave time with
job protection than standard disability allowed.' 0 It is, how-
ever, still a state option, and most states are not likely to be as
generous. The Family Leave Act (which has been building up
support in Congress for several years, but at this writing has
not yet passed),' is a mixed blessing. It recognizes childbirth
as an event entitled to special consideration, but it provides no
form of wage support. An unpaid leave is a desperate burden
for many mothers. In addition, the Family Leave Act, in its
effort to be gender-neutral, ignores the primary role of the
mother in childbirth. Pregnancy and childbirth are not events
in which mother and father can participate equally. The
mother must recover from the fatigue of childbirth, and the
mother breastfeeds the baby, if anyone does. By ignoring the
primacy of motherhood at its beginnings, the model is set for
ignoring the problems of the working mother as the child
grows.
Mothers still have primary responsibility for children most
of the time. Unless the conflict of work and parenting is recog-
nized as largely a women's issue, there can be no real under-
standing of, or solutions to the exploitive nature of female
dominated occupations and part-time work. Women must lead
the battle to re-structure the workplace to include paid mater-
nity and caregiver leaves, optional part-time tracks, child care
97. Id. at 1126.
98. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). At issue in Geduldig was California's disability
insurance program for private employees who were temporarily disabled by
an injury or illness not covered by workers' compensation. The plan was
challenged on equal protection grounds because it excluded disabilities
attributable to normal pregnancies. The Supreme Court upheld the plan's
constitutionality, finding that "[there is no evidence in the record that the
selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against
any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived
by that group or class from the program." Id. at 496.
99. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). This case involved an insurance plan similar
to the disability plan in Geduldig, but the challenge was based on a claim of
discrimination under Title VII. The Court held that Geduldig was on point in
holding that "an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan
providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all." Id.
at 136. The plan withstood the Title VII challenge. Id. at 145-46.
100. California Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
101. S. REP. No. 951, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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support, and other family support policies. It is desirable to
design changes in the structure of the workplace which will
allow fathers to participate more fully in child raising, but this
should be in addition to, not at the expense of, motherhood
issues.
V. CONCLUSION
This analysis of the limitations of equal opportunity in
dealing with the problems of working women, suggests both a
large new vision and specific strategies. A new vision for work-
ing women must go beyond the equal opportunity model to
include the central reality of family responsibilities in the every-
day life of working women. Equal rights and equal opportunity
are stirring concepts which evoke an emotional call to arms, but
the battle is too narrowly drawn. This model demands only the
opportunity to compete with men in a male-defined workplace.
A competitive model which asks for no special favors may be
good for business, but it is bad for women with children. It sets
up women for failure and fails to take responsibility for the
needs of children.
A better vision for women is the broader, more flexible
concept of women's rights rather than equal rights. A women's
rights strategy can go beyond the issue of equality with men
when necessary and recognize and promote the role of mother-
hood and the family in the lives of women. The idea of
women's rights and the tension between this concept and that
of equal rights is not a new issue. When Alice Paul's Woman's
Party first introduced the Equal Rights Amendment in Con-
gress in 1926, the great majority of women who had cam-
paigned for and successfully won suffrage in 1920 considered it
a betrayal of their ideals. Feminist leaders, including Carrie
Chapman Catt, Florence Kelley, and Jane Addams were out-
raged. They claimed it would strike down the much-needed
legislation which protected women from ghastly working con-
ditions in factories.10 2 Obtaining protective legislation had
been a lifelong struggle for many of these women. This legisla-
tion included maximum hour and minimum wage laws for
women and special safety requirements. The courts were
unwilling to grant such protection to men, arguing that it inter-
fered with "freedom of contract," but were willing to grant it to
women because of their special position as mothers or poten-
tial mothers. ' 0 3
102. See DEGLER, supra note 85, at 359.
103. Lois W. BANNER, WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA 101, 102 (1974).
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Today, the "freedom of contract" theory has been aban-
doned and safety legislation is routinely passed for both men
and women. Safety is no longer a women's issue, as indeed it
never was, since dangerous conditions do not recognize gen-
der. 10 4 Contemporary workplace issues which do concern the
special needs of women: maternity leaves, flex-time, part-time
tracks, and childcare arrangements, are being presented as
gender neutral issues, while in reality they are still women's
issues since women bear the greater burden, both biologically
and socially. Moreover, more than a quarter of all families with
children under eighteen are currently headed by single parents,
and the single parent is the mother nine times out of ten.' 5
The major impact of labelling these issues as gender neutral is
to assure that neither gender is willing to fight for them.
An important characteristic of a women's rights vision
should be more emphasis on women's collective activity, and
less on the existing legal system. Title VII and the EPA, even if
fully enforced, are not adequate to meet the needs of women
workers. As shown in this article, the wage gap is not really
addressed by these laws. Title VII permits women to compete
with men in male dominated professions, but it provides little
relief for women in female dominated occupations where dis-
crimination is not the issue. The EPA provides relief only in
the limited cases where men and women are performing the
same job, not where women are performing tasks of compara-
ble value.
As demonstrated in this article, the courts will not enforce
a comparable worth solution under a Title VII claim. Legisla-
tively mandated pay equity on both the state and federal levels
will only come about through persistent collective pressure.
Thus far, comparable worth legislation has been propelled by
the pressure of labor unions with a very high percentage of
working women. The American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the Service Employ-
ees International Union (SEIU), two of the largest activists for
comparable worth, are both in the highly feminized service sec-
tor, which suffers low wages for female workers. Organized
professional women in female-dominated occupations such as
104. Toxic workplace restrictions against women, such as those ruled
against by the U.S. Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Ill S.
Ct. 1196 (199 1), are often compared to the protective legislation of the early
twentieth century. In fact, these restrictions involve the more complicated
fetal rights issue, which is not the scope of this article.
105. See Playing Both Mother and Father, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1985, at 42-
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nursing and teaching have also made comparable worth claims.
For example, librarians at the University of California at Berke-
ley conducted a study which showed that librarians earned
twenty-five to twenty-seven percent less than persons (most of
them males) in academic non-teaching positions. 10 6
Collective action on the part of organized women can also
help women secure family support systems, for example,
parental leaves, part-time tracks, flex-time, and day care'
Changes in the structure of the workplace to accommodate
women with children is of concern to women who work in both
female and male dominated occupations. Most women profes-
sionals in male dominated occupations are not represented by
labor unions. It is up to them, through their professional
associations, such as those available now to most women law-
yers, doctors, and other professionals, to promote family sup-
port systems in workplaces not controlled by collective
bargaining arrangements.
Organizing women workers was one of the major goals of
the first wave of feminism. Two important organizations, the
National Consumer's League and the Women's Trade Union
League, were established by middle-class feminists to help
working women. The original purpose of the Consumer's
League was to raise the level of wages and improve the condi-
tions of work for young women in department stores. This
purpose soon expanded to include a variety of other women's
occupations. The Women's Trade Union League was promi-
nent during the great organizing strikes in the New York City
garment industry in 1909 and 1910.107 Its members walked
picket lines, represented women workers in court, and acted as
organizers for the striking workers.
A contemporary women's rights strategy could re-capture
some of the flexibility of the first wave of feminism and extend
its scope. Today's women workers make up close to half of the
workforce and are therefore in a much stronger position to
restructure the workplace to 'their advantage than women were
at the beginning of the century. Rather than being haunted by
the specter of sexual stereotyping, women can both assert their
special needs and press for higher wages and family support
systems collectively without fear of being driven out of a work-
place that is now dependent upon their labor.
106. See WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 33.
107. See DEGLER, supra note 85, at 318-19.
